A Chinese state-owned company reportedly shipped 46 tons of carbon-fiber precursor to a sanctioned Russian company that supplies material for Geran attack drones.
Shipping documents obtained by POLITICO show that Jilin Chemical Fiber Group sent the material to Alabuga-Volokno, a subsidiary of Russia’s state nuclear corporation Rosatom.
The shipment was reportedly declared as civilian synthetic fiber exports, concealing the material’s dual-use nature.
The precursor is used to produce high-grade carbon fiber for strengthening drone airframes, including their wings and internal structures. An expert who reviewed the documents estimated that the shipment could support the production of up to 1,300 Geran drones.
Jilin has reportedly supplied Alabuga-Volokno with the material since 2022, with at least eight related tenders identified between the two companies.
Alabuga-Volokno produces more than 39 carbon-fiber products for aviation, rocket, and drone applications. Internal projections show that 89 percent of its output will go to Russian defense companies through 2039.
The supply route allows Moscow to secure materials for its drone industry despite Western sanctions imposed on Alabuga-Volokno and its parent company in 2023.
“The number of companies in China that have provided dual-use capabilities to Russia’s military industrial complex is in the dozens now, and those connections are deep,” said Kurt Campbell, former US Deputy Secretary of State, as quoted by POLITICO.
Chinese Components in Russian Drones
A Kiel Institute report estimates that Beijing provides around 60 percent of the foreign components used to sustain Russia’s military production.
Despite China’s persistent denials, Chinese-made components have repeatedly been recovered from the wreckage of Russian drones used in attacks across Ukraine.
Chinese mesh modems have been found on Geran-2 systems, while reports indicate Russia is utilizing a Chinese model of Iranian-designed engines for its attack drones.
Washington has accused Beijing of supplying Russia with dual-use technology in exchange for sensitive submarine and missile technology.
“These are component pieces of a very substantial effort on the part of China to help sustain, build and diversify various elements of the Russian war machine,” Campbell said.
“We’re seeing efforts at the highest levels of both governments to try to both hide and protect certain elements of this worrisome collaboration.”
